mcp-server@0.8.9
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Transloadit MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TRANSLOADIT_MCP_METRICS_PASSWORDTRANSLOADIT_MCP_TOKENTRANSLOADIT_MCP_UPSTREAM_SECRETTRANSLOADIT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: TRANSLOADIT_CLIENT_SUFFIX, TRANSLOADIT_ENDPOINT, TRANSLOADIT_KEY, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_CONSOLE_URL, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_MAX_WAIT_MS, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_METRICS_PATH, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_METRICS_USER, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_RESOURCE_METADATA_URL, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_RESULT_DOMAINS, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_WIDGET_DOMAIN, TRANSLOADIT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM- Where it talks to
- transloadit.com, transloadit.dev, transloadit.net (its own)Also chatgpt.com, claude.ai, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names chatgpt.com, claude.ai, claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TRANSLOADIT_MCP_METRICS_PASSWORD, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_TOKEN, TRANSLOADIT_MCP_UPSTREAM_SECRET, TRANSLOADIT_SECRET only into requests to transloadit.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.8.8
vet-skills diff mcp-server 0.8.8 0.8.9In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.8 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 36 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Settings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode → Create, then enter the URL above withFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.hint: 'Retry with base64 or a public URL, or upload via `npx -y @transloadit/node upload`.',Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.export declare const registerAssemblyResultWidget: (server: McpServer, options?: AssemblyResultWidgetOptions) => void;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Settings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode → Create, then enter the URL above withFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."build": "yarn lint:ts && chmod +x dist/cli.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.