mcp-server@0.8.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Stdio and Streamable HTTP MCP server for Thalovant control-plane and hub runtime APIs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CONSOLE_REPLACE_TOKENMCP_AUTH_TOKENMCP_HTTP_ALLOW_CLIENT_CREDENTIAL_PATHSMCP_HTTP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATEDMCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODEMCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENMCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENSMCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCEMCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERSMCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDMCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETMCP_OAUTH_INTROSPECTION_URLMCP_OAUTH_ISSUERMCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URLMCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPESMCP_OAUTH_SCOPES_SUPPORTEDNO_SECRETS_HERETHALOVANT_ACCESS_KEYTHALOVANT_ACCESS_TOKENTHALOVANT_ALLOW_DEFAULT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALSTHALOVANT_ALLOW_SHARED_CREDENTIALSTHALOVANT_API_TOKENTHALOVANT_PASSWORDTHALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_DIRTHALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_AUDIT_INCLUDE_ARGS, MCP_AUDIT_LOG, MCP_AUDIT_LOG_FILE, MCP_EVENT_STORE_FILE, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_ENABLE_JSON_RESPONSE, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES, MCP_HTTP_PATH, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_HTTP_PUBLIC_URL, MCP_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_MAX- Where it talks to
- thalovant.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CONSOLE_REPLACE_TOKEN, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_CLIENT_CREDENTIAL_PATHS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENS, MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVERS, MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, MCP_OAUTH_INTROSPECTION_URL, MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES, MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES_SUPPORTED, NO_SECRETS_HERE, THALOVANT_ACCESS_KEY, THALOVANT_ACCESS_TOKEN, THALOVANT_ALLOW_DEFAULT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS, THALOVANT_ALLOW_SHARED_CREDENTIALS, THALOVANT_API_TOKEN, THALOVANT_PASSWORD, THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_DIR, THALOVANT_PRINCIPAL_CREDENTIALS_FILE and talks to thalovant.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 7 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const mcpServer = createServer({ transport: "streamable-http" });Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them."build": "tsc && chmod 755 dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.parts.push(`Token missing: the bridge's token has not reached it. If this lasts more than a few minutes, paste the token again in ${CONSOLE_REPLACE_TOKEN}.`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…` and (admin-only) `ownerId` arguments to the model, so it no longer teaches an admin mode that only ever 403s for non-admin callers; only the plain overview call remains…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @thalovant/mcp-server@0.8.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thalovant: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.