Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.69.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Clipwright: generate UGC videos from your coding agent" Observed in sandbox: calls api.clipwright.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher clipwright · publishing for 115 daysInstalls 9,444Last detonated 3 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @clipwright/mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Started with a decoy CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLIPWRIGHT_API_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso unused.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only api.clipwright.io (its own)
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names unused.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY only into requests to clipwright.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY=clipwright.io -- npx -y @clipwright/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.59.0

vet-skills diff mcp-server 0.59.0 0.69.0

This version reaches for something 0.59.0 did not: 18 rewritten tool descriptors (brand_kit, create_asset, create_upload, extract_brand, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
brand_kit, create_asset, create_upload, extract_brand, generate_image, generate_video, get_asset, get_run_shots, list_template_sounds, make_faceless, make_ugc, quote_faceless +6

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: calls api.clipwright.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 46 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.9sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sprocessrelaunched with a decoy CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
46snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.clipwright.io:443
46snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.clipwright.io:443
46sclaimed58 tools with a decoy CLIPWRIGHT_API_KEY: list_workflows, get_workflow, prepare_workflow_plan, plan_reference_remake, get_workflow_plan, approve_workflow_plan, quote_workflow_plan, run_workflow_plan, make_ugc, get_run, get_run_shots, delete_run_media, quote_revision, revise_run, quote_candidate, create_candidate, list_generation_models, quote_image, generate_image, quote_video, generate_video, quote_ugc, upload_image, create_upload, get_upload
46stools1741849627adfc52
46stoolsc8e2af1d228c6c32
46stools6328467b21127e0a
46stoolsd56ea7948d1d537e
46stools75f408cd69fe171e
46stoolsa9f22348b4fce270
46stoolsf7ef397fbdcb3364
46stools295f69600f429223
46stoolsd5af75db3451dab1
46stools99b0b06098b15966
46stools5ba4f8eb4e0e9959
46stools259fc9b23766f7e9
46stools9fde0c961b48f3bc
46stools7ad370135e179773
46stoolsf9d4bd584bc09a48
46stools36ab723b02949edf
46stoolsed6cd8c5b7fc8150
46stools392e14ec63f5544b
46stoolsdb57860e68087b43
46stools0a61d6fc7f1fdf60
46stools5c53095d65ba1eb4
46stoolse938128be7b8be74
46stoolsf6ece5142e32c7d8
46stools13f1e4ac414b1330
46stoolse80994443dd7249a
46stools2a59165e1d908627
46stoolsedcc17d511574846
46stools3525bcca53d82206
46stoolsbaf9a0d2a8415c20
46stools9e435199e2e97f67
46stools5737ff7d88d2f1c8
46stoolsb8c293f90a1383a6
46stoolse3997880f26b8a8e
46stoolsba83a87c6ab57ac8
46stoolsefd9d9cf1a90b7e9
46stools7dc48b80eca0cec2
46stoolsff255acdb3923f2c
46stools02417d2e0d08f2c0
46stools3f42b8054858c48d
46stools62e50b58c849df0c
46stoolsb85ec71659f471c6
46stools9d38963b7140ed1b
46stoolsfe8f8be8b2285d5b
46stoolsa7447afeebaddb84
46stools3fd430b0971a8768
46stools03e24eea32a0f285
46stools1ceec12c62c88a42
46stools9de11583f82935f1
46stools1baebdfbb6128eae
46stools781b40bac13b9cc3
46stools2fc6e7a909fba746
46stools53889052074c876d
46stools7de450d70427757b
46stoolsb6b714ad3defe921
46stools6c1b60236dd55b2b
46stoolsd7696c707da46e17
46stools9fc915c097ecbc99
46stoolse3adec4432ba1d17
46sprocessscript backend runs setup only
46sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:143 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network| VS Code | `.mcp.json`: `{"mcpServers": {"clipwright": {"type": "http", "url": "https://mcp.clipwright.io/mcp"}}}` | from the client's docs |Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/server.js:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…KE_UGC_AGENT_PROTOCOL, MAKE_FACELESS_DESCRIPTION, MAKE_FACELESS_AGENT_PROTOCOL, mcpServerInstructions, makeFacelessInput, offeredFacelessInput, REVISION_CHARGE_TEXT, revisionRequest, UPLOAD_IMAGE_DESCRIPTION, UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES, UPLOAD_MEDIA…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:142 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network| Cursor | `~/.cursor/mcp.json`: `{"mcpServers": {"clipwright": {"url": "https://mcp.clipwright.io/mcp"}}}` | from the client's docs |Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:158 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y -p @clipwright/mcp-server@latest clipwright-mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:196 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code-- npx -y -p @clipwright/mcp-server@latest clipwright-mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈9,501 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈18,245 tok
58 tools · 315 per tool
Handshake
3034 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 333

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @clipwright/mcp-server@0.69.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.