Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.65.19

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Official Porkbun MCP server, built and maintained by Porkbun — exposes the Porkbun v3 API as tools for AI agents (ChatGPT, Claude, Cursor, etc.)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher porkbunllc · publishing for 198 daysInstalls 13,775Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @porkbunllc/mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_ISSUERPORKBUN_API_KEYPORKBUN_SECRET_API_KEYPORKBUN_X402_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_PUBLIC_URL, OPENAI_APPS_CHALLENGE, PORKBUN_BASE_URL, PORKBUN_DOCS_BASE, PORKBUN_X402_MAX_CENTS
Where it talks to
porkbun.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OAUTH_ISSUER, PORKBUN_API_KEY, PORKBUN_SECRET_API_KEY, PORKBUN_X402_PRIVATE_KEY and talks to porkbun.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --secrets OAUTH_ISSUER=porkbun.com,PORKBUN_API_KEY=porkbun.com,PORKBUN_SECRET_API_KEY=porkbun.com,PORKBUN_X402_PRIVATE_KEY=porkbun.com -- npx -y @porkbunllc/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.65.17

vet-skills diff mcp-server 0.65.17 0.65.19

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.65.17 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 46 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
26sprocessdependency install exit 0
46sclaimed169 tools: ping, check_domain, check_domains, get_registration_requirements, get_pricing, list_marketplace, list_domains, get_domain, get_balance, get_auto_topup, top_up_with_usdc, top_up_with_card_mpp, send_phone_verification_code, confirm_phone_verification, send_email_verification_code, confirm_email_verification, get_usdc_topup_status, list_invoices, get_invoice, get_invoice_pdf, configure_auto_topup, top_up_account_credit, get_api_settings, get_nameservers, list_dns_records
46stools41ffeb68a8053dc5
46stools3a9299de23cf513f
46stools772277171e67c1ba
46stools30d3be0f814370ea
46stoolsbf5cadef9bfa3f19
46stools22f64469b3d32af6
46stoolsfc62d46cb02ebf5b
46stools39fc0dc4bac8b160
46stoolsd90513d845862953
46stoolsfbd7b9d686556dc3
46stools3c58a5202727725c
46stoolse7754fee09adee7b
46stools16e58b4ef69ac6cf
46stools3ec071e4084a0ee4
46stoolse7e473db1c9f7f52
46stools5a4d5c2d55fa83a0
46stools762542810bcfc7bd
46stools14609a74c4f6d632
46stoolse18a00d3cedc7a6a
46stools7c833e4a6c0c0e73
46stools1bfcd4a2d79df20d
46stools5a479120233137c3
46stools9c940bf01a6cf64d
46stools35a2e88e69057f4f
46stools8f2136aac9e037b0
46stools5b215e3b941021f2
46stools71b98bb7784fb436
46stools65f773da1b6fffcb
46stoolsa4bce3abc44f8e15
46stools16bc32f25b863697
46stools008ceb218f673dd9
46stoolsf9ddad81fd9e6681
46stoolscba00baa3e00a963
46stools5f0b149924d710c3
46stoolsb6a4ac3bdfadb53d
46stoolsba9a256b70b08d76
46stools1b210f44559d99f9
46stoolsd46d075fa6f14a14
46stoolsfe871eb5057fa9e2
46stools41d9925dfa81bb67
46stools4f92229487c22c4a
46stools90f3f5a73acdf29d
46stools5083e0e9d5f2b8a0
46stoolsa53a24d06311dcb6
46stoolscda037b10944ce9a
46stoolsc3436cd7a4dbbde5
46stoolse867b5b32ebc13bb
46stoolsd250641e119200c2
46stools020d5cd9575e8056
46stoolsea6fab994b834efc
46stools0f5c8a264290c6ee
46stools18bb66a5555230ec
46stools2437f12847188687
46stools0a0f2cd2a881b690
46stoolsf91bb0818e251ce5
46stoolsf2f498774b731046
46stools942aa224fcdeac37
46stoolscdb62bb07fe0ed9c
46stoolsb3276bc838e9054d
46stools35799db9295c64f7
46stools38145ab0b7bc0352
46stools310827e162028ed2
46stoolsc9860a44e673331c
46stools1d164a0594211ba7
46stools406fcf16ab828cec
46stools6c1c67df2151c5ae
46stools29a90d537a26c4ac
46stools60c5a85eb42ad117
46stools71046bcdb1bacf49
46stools44289c3c18c5ff28
46stoolscdabb3915308799e
46stools0acc5be11496502f
46stoolsef73963cdc59c7ca
46stools332dc911f1ddfece
46stools24c5e0c341afc843
46stoolsa6c4bd19f4b8215e
46stools8fa279c3930e4942
46stoolsc90a381c8adfd766
46stools1b9d846cfc345e94
46stools6e8c5653fa9427dc
46sprocessscript backend runs setup only
46sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Tool description instructs the agent: "do not tell the user"mcp:tools/buy_closeout:1 · Instruction aimed at the agent: "do not tell the user"releases it over the following days, so do not tell the user it is in their account: poll list_domains or watch the domaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/tools.js:89 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code… No shell? Link's own MCP server does the same where your client can run one (\`npx -y @stripe/link-cli --mcp\`, or \`link-cli mcp add\` to register it); without eith…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/tools.js:1931 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…tatic Hosting. TEXT FILES GO IN `text`, AS WRITTEN: for .html, .css, .js, .svg, .json, .txt and .xml send { path, text } with the file's contents exactly as you wrote them. Do NOT base64-encode text files; base64 is slow and error-prone fo…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈75 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈60,086 tok
169 tools · 356 per tool
Handshake
5904 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 791

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @porkbunllc/mcp-server@0.65.19 as of 33 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.