Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.2.44

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing Almanak platform API as tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher almanak · publishing for 241 daysInstalls 3,676Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Not enough was observed to say yet. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-server` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.js:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.js:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env.*',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/__tests__/run-test-status.test.js:289 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes(0, node_test_1.test)('a budget kill alone has no secondary failure', () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/testing/__tests__/runner.test.js:586 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait strict_1.default.rejects((0, runner_1.runTestLadder)({ workspacePath: ws, logPath: '/etc/passwd' }, stubController()), /log_path must be inside workspace_path/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/testing/runner.js:450 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// (e.g. ``/etc/passwd``) by passing an absolute path or a ``..``-traversingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.d.ts:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* (EXPORT_SKIP_DIRS / EXPORT_SKIP_FILE_BASENAMES / .env allowlist) — the sameFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/tools.js:1781 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'Session-internal files (.almanak, .almanakdb, almanak_state.db*, .env, .venv, node_modules, .logs) are excluded automatically. ' +Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/testing/runner.js:583 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.js:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.js:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'!.env.example',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/__tests__/run-test-status.test.js:274 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes(0, node_test_1.test)('a strategy failure before a budget kill stays primary; the kill is secondary', () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/workspace-git.js:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'!.env.sample',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/testing/__tests__/agent-v3-tools.test.js:308 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesstrict_1.default.equal((0, agent_v3_1.safeLogFileName)('../../etc/passwd'), '_.._etc_passwd');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressdist/testing/__tests__/platform-client.test.js:191 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringconst client = new client_1.PlatformClient({ baseUrl: 'http://203.0.113.1', token: 'secret', timeout: 1000 });Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressdist/testing/__tests__/platform-client.test.js:191 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringconst client = new client_1.PlatformClient({ baseUrl: 'http://203.0.113.1', token: 'secret', timeout: 1000 });Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/client.js:147 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// (kill pod, leave positions) / restartAgent for the equivalent flows.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/testflow-client.d.ts:61 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** The sidecar's draw budget (30 s) and kill grace (5 s), with room for the response. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/lifecycle-verdict.js:171 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst stop = kill !== null && kill !== void 0 ? kill : failures.find(isKill);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/tools.js:1514 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdescription: "Show the user an editable Strategy Spec panel to review and approve the strategy's risk posture BEFORE building. Call early — after confirming protocol support, before scaffolding. Pass Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/tools.js:1481 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdescription: 'The tokens the strategy will hold. Each item: { symbol, address, chain_id, decimals? }. chain_id is for widget pricing/display, not config.json output.',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/tools.js:1475 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdescription: 'Ask the user how much (in USD) they want to allocate per token when funding a new strategy. Call this once at the very start of strategy creation, after you have determined which tokens Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/lifecycle-verdict.js:154 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = timedOutMessage !== null ? budgetExhausted(timedOutMessage) : null;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/__tests__/testflow-contract.test.js:69 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// settle): the client must still be waiting, or a budget kill reads as a transport failure.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/lifecycle-verdict.js:167 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// The earliest failure of the strategy's own run stays primary; a budget kill or interruptFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/testing/testflow-client.js:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** The sidecar's draw budget (30 s) and kill grace (5 s), with room for the response. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/testing/__tests__/runner.test.js:590 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait strict_1.default.rejects((0, runner_1.runTestLadder)({ workspacePath: ws, logPath: '../../etc/passwd' }, stubController()), /log_path must be inside workspace_path/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @almanak/mcp-server@0.2.44 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim almanak: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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