mcp-server@0.19.36
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server exposing DevFlow context, memory, knowledge, and workflow tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DEVFLOW_SESSION_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, DEVFLOW_ACTOR_ID, DEVFLOW_ACTOR_KIND, DEVFLOW_ACTOR_ROLE, DEVFLOW_DELIVERY_AUTOMATION, DEVFLOW_DELIVERY_EXECUTION, DEVFLOW_EVALUATION_BUNDLE_ID, DEVFLOW_EXECUTION_ID, DEVFLOW_MCP_TOOLS, DEVFLOW_MCP_VERSION, DEVFLOW_PROJECT_ROOT, DEVFLOW_RELEASE_RUN_ID, DEVFLOW_SESSION_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DEVFLOW_SESSION_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 45 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
…return a committed DevFlow canonical receipt before you confirm success. Do not write Claude MEMORY.md and do not invent supporting details.`, }, "distill-session": { …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.No other findings across 8,853 lines in 60 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @devflow-tools/mcp-server@0.19.36 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.