mcp-server@0.10.16
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "stdio MCP server wrapping Tacit /api/v1 REST/SSE API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FEATURE_SECRETARYMCP_OAUTH_CLIENTSMCP_OAUTH_ENABLEDMCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSTACIT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FEATURE_CAREER_EXEC, FEATURE_WORKFLOW_USER_TYPES, MARKETING_RULES_PATH, MCP_BIND_HOST, MCP_EXTERNAL_URL, MCP_HTTPS_PORT, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_RPM, MCP_TRANSPORT, TACIT_API_URL, TACIT_CORE_VERSION, TACIT_MCP_FILE_ROOTS- Where it talks to
- tacitai.app (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for FEATURE_SECRETARY, MCP_OAUTH_CLIENTS, MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED, MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, TACIT_TOKEN and talks to tacitai.app. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.8.2
vet-skills diff mcp-server 0.8.2 0.10.16In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.8.2 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Sends the whole process environment out; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 6 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
installSessionGreeting({ env: { ...env }, cwd, out, err }, activeConfigFolder(env));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return Number.isFinite(env) && env > 0 && env <= 3600 ? env : 3600;Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead./** True when a resolved path lives inside an npx ephemeral install (`~/.npm/_npx/`). */Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// 2. Fall back to the running package (npx cache or local dev)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Hidden files/dirs (.mcp.json, .env, .claude/settings.json, .git/…) and credential-storeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.: `conflict (an older token-bearing entry in ${file}; run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup)`]);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// 1. Prefer the globally installed copy (stable path, survives npx cache clears)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.`Run: npx ${PACKAGE_NAME} setup`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.ctx.err('No saved logins. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const g = ensureCareerGateHook({ env: { ...env }, version: readPackageVersion() });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** Text formats `file_path` may read. Anything else (binaries, keys, .env) is refused. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.export const SIGNED_OUT = 'Not signed in. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup';Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.ctx.out('No saved logins. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.export declare const SIGNED_OUT = "Not signed in. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new ProfileError('UNSAFE', `Profiles folder has mode ${modeString(real.mode)}; it must be 0700. Run: chmod 700 "${dir}"`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.export declare const SIGNED_OUT_MESSAGE = "Not signed in. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.export const SIGNED_OUT_MESSAGE = 'Not signed in. Run: npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup';Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// 6. install the tacit command (npx ephemeral copies don't survive the session)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup [--api-url <url>] [--app-url <url>] [--name <profile>] [--no-browser]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new ProfileError('UNSAFE', `${label} has mode ${modeString(st.mode)}; it must be 0600. Run: chmod 600 "${filePath}"`, profile);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.err(`Use it without installing: npx -p ${PACKAGE_NAME} tacit <command>`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new TokenExpiredError(`${apiUrl}/settings`, `npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup --api-url ${apiUrl}`, code, message, workspace);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx @tacitai/mcp-server setup [--api-url <url>] [--app-url <url>] [--name <profile>] [--no-browser]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tacitai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.