Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.10.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "ClearList MCP Server — AI agent interface to the ClearList API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher clearlist · publishing for 109 daysInstalls 633Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @clearlist/mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Needs
CLEARLIST_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYCLEARLIST_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLEARLIST_API_URL, CONFIG_PATH
Where it talks to
clearlist.me (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for API_KEY, CLEARLIST_API_KEY and talks to clearlist.me. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets API_KEY=clearlist.me,CLEARLIST_API_KEY=clearlist.me -- npx -y @clearlist/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for CLEARLIST_API_KEY); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 48 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.0sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sprocessrelaunched with a decoy CLEARLIST_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
47sclaimedstartup only: exited before answering, asking for CLEARLIST_API_KEY (a decoy value was refused)
47sprocessscript backend runs setup only
47sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/cli.js:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// Windows: chmod is a no-op; the file lives under the user profile.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/ui/register.js:6 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…,o.allowUnsafeEval||d.config({jitless:!0}),this.setRequestHandler(en,i=>(console.log(\"Received ping:\",i.params),{})),this.setEventHandler(\"hostcontextchanged\",void 0)}_assertInitialized(r){if(this._initializedSent)return;let n=`[ext-ap…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/api-client.js:770 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// response, it is a Vercel kill mid-listing with no diagnostic.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Base64 encoding combined with network calldist/ui/register.js:6 · Base64 encoding combined with network call — potential data exfiltration…um(e){let t=\"\";for(let r=0;r<e.length;r++)t+=String.fromCharCode(e[r]);return btoa(t)}function ty(e){let t=e.replace(/-/g,\"+\").replace(/_/g,\"/\"),r=\"=\".repeat((4-t.length%4)%4);return cm(t+r)}function ry(e){return um(e).replace(/\\+…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @clearlist/mcp-server@0.10.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.