Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.0.1-alpha.17

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Prototype MCP Server for CLL" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher chainlink · publishing for 513 daysInstalls 427Last detonated 20 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @chainlink/mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYMCP_MAX_TOKENSOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EMBEDDINGS_PROVIDER, MCP_LLM_MODEL, MCP_LLM_SERVICE, OLLAMA_EMBEDDING_MODEL, OLLAMA_MODEL, OLLAMA_URL, OPENAI_EMBEDDING_MODEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso chain.link — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names chain.link as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, MCP_MAX_TOKENS, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @chainlink/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 51 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
30sprocessdependency install exit 0
50sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:743) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) [2026-11-13T16:40:16.547Z] ERROR: Required configuration missing: CCIP combined config (mainnet), CCIP combined config (testnet) [2026-11-13T16:40:16.547Z] ERROR: Fatal error in main(): Error: Required configuration missing:
50sprocessscript backend runs setup only
50sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/services/gemini-service.js:48 · Destructive file system command detected// Convert messages to Gemini formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/vectordb/pipeline.js:205 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslogger_1.Logger.log("error", `Failed to save entries to ${outputPath}: ${error}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:31 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:production": "tsc && npx ts-node scripts/build-production.ts && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:32 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:config": "tsc && npx ts-node scripts/build-config.ts && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/vectordb/pipeline.js:202 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslogger_1.Logger.log("info", `Saved ${entries.length} entries to ${outputPath}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config/index.js:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env file FIRSTFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/vectordb/pipeline.js:223 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslogger_1.Logger.log("info", `Loaded ${entries.length} entries from ${inputPath}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/vectordb/pipeline.js:227 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslogger_1.Logger.log("error", `Failed to load entries from ${inputPath}: ${error}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:30 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "rm -rf dist && tsc -p tsconfig.mcp.json && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @chainlink/mcp-server@0.0.1-alpha.17 as of 20 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.