Skills/npm/mcp-server-zapsign

mcp-server-zapsign@2.1.2

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Official ZapSign MCP server — remote OAuth (Cloudflare Workers) and local STDIO via npx" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher zapsign · publishing for 463 daysInstalls 1,076Last detonated 18 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-zapsign -- npx -y mcp-server-zapsign
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_ROUTE_PATHSZAPSIGN_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ZAPSIGN_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
zapsign.com.br (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OAUTH_ROUTE_PATHS, ZAPSIGN_API_KEY and talks to zapsign.com.br. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets OAUTH_ROUTE_PATHS=zapsign.com.br,ZAPSIGN_API_KEY=zapsign.com.br -- npx -y mcp-server-zapsign

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 53 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
33sprocessdependency install exit 0
53sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5) { code: 'ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ESM_URL_SCHEME' } Node.js v22.23.5
53sprocessscript backend runs setup only
53sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:6 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeOfficial ZapSign MCP server — remote OAuth (Cloudflare Workers) and local STDIO via npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

No other findings across 3,062 lines in 6 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-zapsign@2.1.2 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.