Skills/npm/mcp-server-yjzf

mcp-server-yjzf@0.8.6

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for YJZF" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher yjzf · publishing for 213 daysInstalls 1,027Last detonated 27 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-yjzf -- npx -y @yjzf/mcp-server-yjzf
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
YJZF_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DATA_DIR, MCP_GATEWAY_BASE_URL, YJZF_DATA_DIR
Where it talks to
yjzf.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for YJZF_ACCESS_TOKEN and talks to yjzf.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets YJZF_ACCESS_TOKEN=yjzf.com -- npx -y @yjzf/mcp-server-yjzf

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.1sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-U6bx8W/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-server-yjzf/dist/tools/contract/investment_contract.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv.config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, "../.env"), quiet: true });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// 以脚本自身位置为基准加载 .env，避免因 cwd 不同导致环境变量丢失Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @yjzf/mcp-server-yjzf@0.8.6 as of 27 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.