Skills/npm/mcp-server-slack

mcp-server-slack@0.3.8

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Slack workspace MCP server — channels, messages, threads, reactions, users, files, bookmarks, scheduling via Slack Web API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mindstone · publishing for 181 daysInstalls 2,371Last detonated 53 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-slack -- npx -y @mindstone/mcp-server-slack
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SLACK_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_WORKSPACE_PATH, SLACK_CLIENT_ID, SLACK_CONFIG_PATH, SLACK_DISABLE_REFRESH, SLACK_MAX_RETRIES, SLACK_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, SLACK_TEAM_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SLACK_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @mindstone/mcp-server-slack

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.3.7

vet-skills diff mcp-server-slack 0.3.7 0.3.8

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.3.7 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.3.7 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 8 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.4sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-kCqswv/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-15T23_03_10_835Z-debug-0.log
7.4sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
7.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
7.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/client.js:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* An invalid team ID (e.g. `../../etc/passwd`) throws from the providerFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/tokenProvider.js:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `SLACK_TEAM_ID=../../etc/passwd` and similar misconfigurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/tokenProvider.d.ts:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* a corrupt file (or a `chmod 000` file) gets the same response as aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/tokenProvider.js:123 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* a corrupt file (or a `chmod 000` file) gets the same response as aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/tokenProvider.js:575 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// Windows: chmod on some filesystems is a no-op or unsupported.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:25 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"compile": "tsc && shx chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/tokenProvider.js:563 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// Best effort — Windows may reject chmod on some filesystems.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/tokenProvider.js:566 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// MED-2: explicit chmod on the FINAL path. rename() preserves theFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.