Skills/npm/mcp-server-search

mcp-server-search@1.2.29

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for web search operations" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher agent-infra · publishing for 602 daysInstalls 636Last detonated 12 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-search -- npx -y @agent-infra/mcp-server-search
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BING_SEARCH_API_KEYTAVILY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BING_SEARCH_API_BASE_URL, DESCRIPTION, NAME, VERSION
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for BING_SEARCH_API_KEY, TAVILY_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @agent-infra/mcp-server-search

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 39 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
18sprocessdependency install exit 0
38sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · '/tmp/ks-detonate-sBQ96B/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-server-search/dist/index.cjs' ] } Node.js v22.23.5
38sprocessscript backend runs setup only
38sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:41 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "shx rm -rf dist && rslib build && shx chmod +x dist/*.{js,cjs}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:43 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"dev": "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/inspector tsx src/index.ts",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @agent-infra/mcp-server-search@1.2.29 as of 12 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.