Skills/npm/mcp-server-scf

mcp-server-scf@5.0.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the SCF Controls Platform — security compliance controls, frameworks, evidence, and risk management for AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher markac007 · publishing for 275 daysInstalls 3,760Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-scf -- npx -y mcp-server-scf
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SCF_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_JSON_RESPONSE, MCP_MAX_BODY_BYTES, MCP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, SCF_API_TIMEOUT_MS, SCF_API_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SCF_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y mcp-server-scf

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 4.1.0

vet-skills diff mcp-server-scf 4.1.0 5.0.0

This version reaches for something 4.1.0 did not: 6 rewritten tool descriptors (scf_catalog_read, scf_control_write, scf_load_tools, scf_risk_read, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
scf_catalog_read, scf_control_write, scf_load_tools, scf_risk_read, scf_risk_write, scf_update_org_settings

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 36 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
16sprocessdependency install exit 0
36sclaimed26 tools: scf_catalog_read, scf_control_read, scf_control_write, scf_evidence_read, scf_evidence_write, scf_evidence_file_read, scf_evidence_file_write, scf_list_evidence_tasks, scf_evidence_task_write, scf_assessment_read, scf_assessment_write, scf_risk_read, scf_risk_write, scf_custom_risk_read, scf_custom_risk_write, scf_vendor_read, scf_vendor_write, scf_vendor_record_write, scf_system_read, scf_system_write, scf_capability_theme_read, scf_org_read, scf_update_org_settings, scf_user_read, scf_mark_notifications_read
36stoolsb4ed2a2abf4300cb
36stoolsf47ff8c80a6b15d8
36stools757e6097f015ec00
36stools36a13f8df646f242
36stoolsf6a75c9b629cf4f8
36stoolsefd4ac8b5eeb7388
36stools804fe7b3040171cb
36stools7f0662cc5a798001
36stoolsd36c13cc9ea1cc2e
36stools24fc126e5fdfb4a7
36stools2bc13112a2fe2a8d
36stools6481a19227ededa0
36stools3d602b222d3b34f7
36stools01706a429e5aa839
36stoolse8317473ea41db2b
36stools0315aede8289f685
36stoolsab2cb53a034af4ee
36stoolsc991f9a222dd6b8c
36stools7267fbe5274cf1e7
36stools50b2824a328742bc
36stools98cf6e09d93b259b
36stools423868e2d638d841
36stools46e390f5b32a1379
36stools7bc778b05ff654ca
36stoolscd9d462d252feb8b
36stools6e37cd6136304b0a
36sprocessscript backend runs setup only
36sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod 755 build/index.js build/http.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)build/server.js:48 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network* McpServer per request, so it collects once per process and passes it in.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)package.json:9 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"mcp-server-scf-http": "./build/http.js"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)build/server.d.ts:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network* McpServer per request, so it collects once per process and passes it in.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈69 tok
1 file · 69 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈26,496 tok
26 tools · 1019 per tool
Handshake
2492 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 167

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-scf@5.0.0 as of 25 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.