mcp-server-msteams@1.0.5
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Microsoft Teams MCP Server with Assignment Automation, file attachments, and turn-in capabilities" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, office.com, microsoft.us, cloud.microsoft, microsoftonline.com, a.com, b.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 12 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
expect(sanitizeLinkUrl('file:///etc/passwd')).toBe('#');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ key: 'polarbear', description: 'Polar bear 🐻❄️', category: 'animal' },Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.: 'Install Google Chrome, Brave (brave-browser), Chromium, or Firefox on Linux (e.g. sudo apt install chromium-browser).';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.expect(isTeamsUrl('https://teams.microsoft.com/v2/#/conversations/19:[email protected]')).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Map to TranscriptEntry formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-msteams@1.0.5 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kasim672: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.