mcp-server-logzio@1.0.7
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Logz.io log management platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
LOGZIO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LOGZIO_MAX_RESULTS, LOGZIO_REGION, LOGZIO_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, LOGZIO_TIMEOUT, LOGZIO_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso logz.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names logz.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LOGZIO_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.0.6
vet-skills diff mcp-server-logzio 1.0.6 1.0.7In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.6 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.0.6 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 78 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
npx mcp-server-logzio apiKey your-keyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx mcp-server-logzioFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx mcp-server-logzio apiKey <your-api-key>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."build": "tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-logzio@1.0.7 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.