Skills/npm/mcp-server-ftp

mcp-server-ftp@1.4.1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for FTP access" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher alxspiker · publishing for 123 daysInstalls 1,110Last detonated 16 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server-ftp -- npx -y mcp-server-ftp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FTP_PASSWORDFTP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHFTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDConfiguration, not credentials: APIFY_META_ORIGIN, FTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FTP_HOST, FTP_HOST_KEY_SHA256, FTP_LOCAL_ROOTS, FTP_PASSPHRASE, FTP_PORT, FTP_PROTOCOL, FTP_SECURE, FTP_USER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso 1password.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names 1password.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FTP_PASSWORD, FTP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, FTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y mcp-server-ftp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.4.0

vet-skills diff mcp-server-ftp 1.4.0 1.4.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.4.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
12sprocessdependency install exit 0
32sclaimed11 tools: list-directory, download-file, upload-file, upload-local-file, download-to-local, create-directory, delete-file, delete-directory, rename-file, edit-file, append-file
32stools5234275896141a70
32stools73dbd254d4120676
32stools50aede8436a11ec7
32stools0796a96a09276402
32stools4de192fb9210c578
32stoolsfcf67a48eadb13bc
32stools03e20c85dfcd95da
32stoolsf04a4757daaf9f72
32stoolsac8f6a0806b019f1
32stools42cfd525d02fb51b
32stools00f97d06c4bea292
32sprocessscript backend runs setup only
32sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/sftp-client.js:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// back to ~/.ssh defaults. The in-flight promise is memoized so concurrentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorybuild/sftp-client.js:18 · References a credential file in the home directoryconst DEFAULT_KEY_PATHS = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519", "~/.ssh/id_rsa", "~/.ssh/id_ecdsa"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/sftp-client.js:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// key at ~/.ssh/id_rsa) silently shadows an explicitly configuredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorybuild/sftp-client.js:60 · References a credential file in the home directory// key at ~/.ssh/id_rsa) silently shadows an explicitly configuredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/sftp-client.js:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst DEFAULT_KEY_PATHS = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519", "~/.ssh/id_rsa", "~/.ssh/id_ecdsa"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈1,266 tok
11 tools · 115 per tool
Handshake
618 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 101

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.