mcp-server-ftp@1.4.1
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for FTP access" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FTP_PASSWORDFTP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHFTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDConfiguration, not credentials: APIFY_META_ORIGIN, FTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FTP_HOST, FTP_HOST_KEY_SHA256, FTP_LOCAL_ROOTS, FTP_PASSPHRASE, FTP_PORT, FTP_PROTOCOL, FTP_SECURE, FTP_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso 1password.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names 1password.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FTP_PASSWORD, FTP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, FTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.4.0
vet-skills diff mcp-server-ftp 1.4.0 1.4.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.4.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// back to ~/.ssh defaults. The in-flight promise is memoized so concurrentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const DEFAULT_KEY_PATHS = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519", "~/.ssh/id_rsa", "~/.ssh/id_ecdsa"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// key at ~/.ssh/id_rsa) silently shadows an explicitly configuredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// key at ~/.ssh/id_rsa) silently shadows an explicitly configuredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const DEFAULT_KEY_PATHS = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519", "~/.ssh/id_rsa", "~/.ssh/id_ecdsa"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.