Skills/npm/mcp-searxng

mcp-searxng@2.11.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for SearXNG integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher ihor-sokoliuk · publishing for 583 daysInstalls 63,332Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTH_PASSWORDAUTH_USERNAMEMCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODEMCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENMCP_HTTP_OAUTH_SCOPESConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES, CACHE_TTL_MS, FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_EXPOSE_FULL_CONFIG, MCP_HTTP_HARDEN, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_HTTP_SESSION_IDLE_TTL_MS, MCP_HTTP_SESSION_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_HTTP_STATELESS, MCP_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, SEARCH_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES, SEARCH_CACHE_TTL_MS, SEARCH_HTTP_PROXY, SEARCH_HTTPS_PROXY, SEARCH_USER_AGENT, SEARXNG_DEFAULT_LANGUAGE, SEARXNG_DEFAULT_RESPONSE_FORMAT, SEARXNG_DEFAULT_SAFESEARCH, SEARXNG_FANOUT, SEARXNG_HEALTHCHECK_TIMEOUT_MS, SEARXNG_HTML_FALLBACK, SEARXNG_LITE_TOOLS, SEARXNG_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, SEARXNG_MAX_RESULT_CHARS, SEARXNG_MAX_RESULTS, SEARXNG_STARTUP_HEALTHCHECK, SEARXNG_TIMEOUT_MS, SEARXNG_URL, URL_READ_MAX_CHARS, URL_READ_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH_BYTES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AUTH_PASSWORD, AUTH_USERNAME, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_HTTP_OAUTH_SCOPES and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y mcp-searxng

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.10.1

vet-skills diff mcp-searxng 2.10.1 2.11.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.10.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
27sprocessdependency install exit 0
47sclaimed4 tools: searxng_web_search, searxng_search_suggestions, searxng_instance_info, web_url_read
47stoolse57c53ba7eeaeacf
47stools9a94348c4c003fec
47stoolsc10a5ef47a1a84f7
47stoolsbb8e59f8469f9ece
47sprocessscript backend runs setup only
47sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/resources.js:154 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…g., http://localhost:8080). For Basic Auth, embed credentials in the URL (e.g., https://user:[email protected]); percent-encode special characters in the username or passwo…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/error-handler.js:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn 'Run: sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/ca.crt';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/url-reader.js:447 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networklogMessage(mcpServer, "info", `Processed cached URL: ${url} (${result.length} chars in ${duration}ms)`);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:e2e": "node --env-file-if-exists=.env.e2e --import tsx __tests__/e2e/run-e2e.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/error-handler.js:45 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn 'Run: sudo cp /path/to/ca.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/ && sudo update-ca-certificates';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/proxy.js:299 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"Please provide a valid URL (e.g., http://proxy:8080 or http://user:pass@proxy:8080)");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:80 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Capability comparison recorded on 2026-07-29</summary> As of 2026-07-29, the capability comparison below reflects the official [Brave MCP](https://githFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 68 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈1,782 tok
4 tools · 446 per tool
Handshake
815 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 570

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ihor-sokoliuk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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