Skills/npm/mcp-sanitizer

mcp-sanitizer@1.4.4

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Comprehensive security sanitization library for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers with trusted security libraries" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher starman69 · publishing for 467 daysInstalls 3,204Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.4.3

vet-skills diff mcp-sanitizer 1.4.3 1.4.4

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.4.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/config/security-policies.js:263 · Destructive file system command detected'rm -rf', 'del /s', 'format', 'mkfs',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sanitizer/validators/command.js:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/\.env/i // Environment filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/validation-utils.js:274 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.npmrc', '.netrc', '.env', '.git-credentials',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sanitizer/validators/index.js:300 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn await validators.sql.sanitize(input, options);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sanitizer/validators/index.js:296 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn await validators.sql.validate(input, options);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/config/security-policies.js:264 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges'sudo rm', 'sudo del'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/validation-utils.js:199 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// user's home directory (e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa) pass with blocked=false.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config/security-policies.js:330 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env', '.example', '.template'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config/security-policies.js:287 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesblockedDirectories: ['/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow']Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/utils/validation-utils.js:199 · References a credential file in the home directory// user's home directory (e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa) pass with blocked=false.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/validation-utils.js:270 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Directory or file names that hold credentials; `.env.*` is matched separately.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/validation-utils.js:312 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* substrings, so a sensitive first segment (`.env`, `.ssh/id_rsa`) is caught.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sanitizer/mcp-sanitizer.js:23 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* console.log('Sanitized input:', result.sanitized);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 37 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim starman69: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim starman69Propose a patch to the maintainer