Skills/npm/mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor

mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor@1.0.1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "A company's public feature board: top requests, votes, status, integration asks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher mambalabsdev · publishing for 166 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor -- npx -y @mambalabsdev/mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
APIFY_TOKEN
Where it talks to
apify.com (its own)Also canny.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names canny.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects APIFY_TOKEN only into requests to apify.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets APIFY_TOKEN=apify.com -- npx -y @mambalabsdev/mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 25 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
4.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
25sclaimed1 tool: get_feature_board_requests
25sprocessscript backend runs setup only
25sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:16 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod +x build/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 439 lines in 6 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈117 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈922 tok
1 tool · 922 per tool
Handshake
370 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 1057

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @mambalabsdev/mcp-public-feature-board-roadmap-monitor@1.0.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.