mcp-products@0.23.29
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TELORA_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: INCIDENT_KEY_MAX, INCIDENT_KEY_PREFIX, TELORA_MCP_PRELOAD, TELORA_MCP_PROFILE, TELORA_STATE_DIR, TELORA_TRACKER_ID, TELORA_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso syntelyos.com, staging.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names syntelyos.com, staging.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TELORA_ACCESS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* install (see resolveDaemonBinary). There is no npx fallback.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* install. There is NO npx fallback: a long-running daemon launched from theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx cache (~/.npm/_npx/<hash>/) cannot self-update -- `npm install -g`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* global install (`npm install -g @telora/daemon@latest`) -- sinceFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.* install-or-error rather than silently bootstrap a non-updating npx daemon.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// self-update target, so spawn WITHOUT --no-auto-update and let the daemonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* --no-auto-update policy: npm-mode self-update (packages/daemon/src/Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* global install (`npm install -g @telora/daemon@latest`) -- sinceFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.* self-update.ts) runs `npm install -g @telora/daemon@latest` -- it updatesFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.* { found: false } when the install throws or still nothing resolves. npx isFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* install-or-error rather than silently bootstrap a non-updating npx daemon.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx cache (~/.npm/_npx/<hash>/) cannot self-update -- `npm install -g`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// not-found -- there is deliberately no npx last-resort.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.baseUrl: z.string().optional().describe("Local-model base URL, e.g. http://10.1.1.146:8888/v1 (register_local_endpoint)"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.// No npx fallback: npx cannot self-update a long-running daemon. The callerFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* self-update.ts) runs `npm install -g @telora/daemon@latest` -- it updatesFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.// KEEPS --no-auto-update (non-obvious): self-update installs to the npmFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* install. There is NO npx fallback: a long-running daemon launched from theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// `npx @telora/mcp-products init` -- interactive setup for Telora MCP serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* --no-auto-update policy: npm-mode self-update (packages/daemon/src/Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @telora/mcp-products@0.23.29 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.