Skills/npm/mcp-mailtrap

mcp-mailtrap@0.13.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Official MCP Server for Mailtrap" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mailtrap · publishing for 589 daysInstalls 3,617Last detonated 22 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-mailtrap -- npx -y mcp-mailtrap
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MAILTRAP_ORGANIZATION_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MAILTRAP_ACCOUNT_ID, MAILTRAP_ORGANIZATION_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MAILTRAP_ORGANIZATION_API_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y mcp-mailtrap

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 41 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sprocessdependency install exit 0
40sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · '/tmp/ks-detonate-avORnp/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-mailtrap/dist/index.js' ] } Node.js v22.23.5
40sprocessscript backend runs setup only
40sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:27 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"prepublishOnly": "npm run build && shx chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:1299 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileGet all resources (sandboxes, projects, domains, billing, account) to which the API token has admin access, nested by hierarchy.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-mailtrap@0.13.1 as of 22 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.