mcp-intelli-search@0.23.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Standalone intelligent web research engine and Model Context Protocol stdio server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENSOPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: INTELLI_SEARCH_CONFIG, INTELLI_SEARCH_WORKSPACE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso cloudflare.com, nextjs.org, vite.dev, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cloudflare.com, nextjs.org, vite.dev, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.22.0
vet-skills diff mcp-intelli-search 0.22.0 0.23.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.22.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 25 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Generated from the repository README.md by scripts/generate-package-readmes.mjs. Edit the root README.md, then run npm run generate:readmes.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.const operationEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.