Skills/npm/mcp-intelli-search

mcp-intelli-search@0.23.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Standalone intelligent web research engine and Model Context Protocol stdio server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher curio-data · publishing for 41 daysInstalls 1,320Last detonated 38 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-intelli-search -- npx -y @curio-data/mcp-intelli-search
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENSOPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: INTELLI_SEARCH_CONFIG, INTELLI_SEARCH_WORKSPACE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso cloudflare.com, nextjs.org, vite.dev, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cloudflare.com, nextjs.org, vite.dev, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS, OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @curio-data/mcp-intelli-search

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.22.0

vet-skills diff mcp-intelli-search 0.22.0 0.23.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.22.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 25 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
25sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:2272) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) mcp-intelli-search: Explicit --config and --workspace are required (or their INTELLI_SEARCH_* environment equivalents)
25sprocessscript backend runs setup only
25sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated from the repository README.md by scripts/generate-package-readmes.mjs. Edit the root README.md, then run npm run generate:readmes.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-B5ZMILMB.js:4320 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst operationEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈63 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.