Skills/npm/mcp-discord

mcp-discord@1.2.2

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Discord MCP server for integrating Discord with LLMs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher missionsquad · publishing for 614 daysInstalls 4,816Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-discord -- npx -y @missionsquad/mcp-discord
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DISCORD_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLEANUP_INTERVAL, MAX_RETRIES, RETRY_BASE_DELAY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DISCORD_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @missionsquad/mcp-discord

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 35 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sclaimed7 tools: send_message, read_messages, register_commands, create_listener, remove_listener, list_listeners, list_handlers
34stools7047051974723e70
34stools62ed0e0f7467ffb9
34stools9416c714a58482bd
34stools2986edfe5013945e
34stools6a7b175b791370fe
34stools96ead74df17f7732
34stools85d0d12409858766
34sprocessscript backend runs setup only
34sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "npm run clean && tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 2,767 lines in 32 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 32 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈600 tok
7 tools · 86 per tool
Handshake
2076 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 43

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.