mcp-appstore-connect@0.32.1
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for the Apple App Store Connect API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
APP_STORE_CONNECT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSConfiguration, not credentials: APP_STORE_CONNECT_ALLOW_WRITES, APP_STORE_CONNECT_CONFIG, APP_STORE_CONNECT_CONTACT_EMAIL, APP_STORE_CONNECT_CONTACT_FIRST_NAME, APP_STORE_CONNECT_CONTACT_LAST_NAME, APP_STORE_CONNECT_CONTACT_PHONE, APP_STORE_CONNECT_DEBUG, APP_STORE_CONNECT_ISSUER_ID, APP_STORE_CONNECT_KEY_ID, APP_STORE_CONNECT_MAX_RETRIES, APP_STORE_CONNECT_METADATA_ROOT, APP_STORE_CONNECT_P8, APP_STORE_CONNECT_P8_PATH, APP_STORE_CONNECT_VENDOR_NUMBER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects APP_STORE_CONNECT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 31 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if (statSync(path).mode & 63) process.stderr.write(`[appstore-connect] ${path} is readable by other users. Run: chmod 600 ${path}\n`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.No other findings across 10,430 lines in 9 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @mgcrea/mcp-appstore-connect@0.32.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.