maplith@1.2.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Share a folder of data files read-only over MCP, and fill it from PostgreSQL under a read-only role." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DATABASE_URLDEFAULT_TOKEN_FILEMAPLITH_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILEPGPASSWORDor--print-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: EXPORT_DIR, MAPLITH_BRIDGE_QUIET, MAPLITH_WORKSPACE, PGHOST, PGSSLMODE- Where it talks to
- maplith.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DATABASE_URL, DEFAULT_TOKEN_FILE, MAPLITH_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE, PGPASSWORD and talks to maplith.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 21 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if (process.platform !== 'win32' && (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) return { problem: `${file} can be read by other users. Run: chmod 600 ${file}` };Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.io.stdout(' 3. Bearer token: type the token from the token file, in the app only, never into a chat with an assistant.');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* codex mcp add maplith-bridge --env EXPORT_DIR=<folder> -- npx -y maplith@<this version> bridge stdioFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for maplith@1.2.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.