Skills/npm/maker

maker@0.0.41

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "TapTap Maker local development CLI and MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher taptap · publishing for 221 daysInstalls 24,195Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add maker -- npx -y @taptap/maker
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @taptap/maker

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/maker-scene-furniture-workflow/SKILL.md:47 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…。脚本不调用生成服务,不覆盖输出,不弹保存框。失败留下 .incomplete,查清原因后换新输出路径;不得把部分目录当成成功。 读预览目录 manifest.json。对每个 item,将 {title,frameSetInfo} 写入临时 input JSON,通过 canvas import --file <预览PNG绝对路径> --input-file <JSON> 导入动画卡;使用返回的新 ID 排版。此入口要求支持 frameSetInfo 的 Maker 版本…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedskills/maker-ui-workflow/scripts/assemble-ui.mjs:2814 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsconsole.error("UI \u7EC4\u88C5\u672A\u5B8C\u6210\uFF1A" + error.message);Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesskills/update-taptap-mcp/SKILL.md:119 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesStatus reads are intentionally read-only. Do not modify `AGENTS.md` from `maker://status` orFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/maker-ui-workflow/scripts/assemble-ui.mjs:2810 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Usage: node <skill>/scripts/assemble-ui.mjs <project> <layout.json> <new-output-dir> [corrections.json]"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesskills/update-taptap-mcp/SKILL.md:50 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesconfirmed, explain that this refresh will not update project `AGENTS.md`, then runFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/update-taptap-mcp/SKILL.md:113 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y -p @taptap/maker@<TARGET_VERSION> taptap-maker agents update --target-dir <PROJECT_DIR>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/update-taptap-mcp/SKILL.md:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y -p @taptap/maker@<TARGET_VERSION> taptap-maker upgrade --target-dir <PROJECT_DIR>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/update-taptap-mcp/SKILL.md:51 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx -y -p @taptap/maker@<TARGET_VERSION> taptap-maker upgrade` without `--target-dir` only after theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈9,488 tok
8 files · 44 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @taptap/maker@0.0.41 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.