loopctl-mcp-server@3.6.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for loopctl — structural trust for AI development loops" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try loopctl-mcp-server` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* process-lifetime id, every npx respawn or `/mcp` reconnect turns the session's OWN liveFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// so a symlink named x.json cannot point at /etc/passwd or /procFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// one-shot post shape. With the process-lifetime id an npx respawn mid-lease 404'dFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.| `place_dispatch` | **Place a queued story on a runner** (`POST /api/v1/runners/:runner_id/dispatches`): claims it under a freshly minted custody dispatch and pushes the work. The control-side triggeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.// process-lifetime uuid turns every npx respawn or /mcp reconnect into a 409 on thisFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."Pass api_key_id (api_keys.id credential) OR agent_id (agents.id logical identity) — not both. " +Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for loopctl-mcp-server@3.6.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.