Skills/npm/leadsradar-agent

leadsradar-agent@1.0.159

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "探栗(LeadsRadar)AI 助手接入包——让豆包工作 / WorkBuddy / Codex / Claude 直接管住你的小红书·抖音获客雷达,全程本机流转" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher dahuang338 · publishing for 36 daysInstalls 34,221Last detonated 44 min ago
$claude mcp add leadsradar-agent -- npx -y leadsradar-agent
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso leadsradar.cn, xiaohongshu.com, jsdelivr.com, npmmirror.com, jsdelivr.net, unpkg.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y leadsradar-agent

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.0.158

vet-skills diff leadsradar-agent 1.0.158 1.0.159

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.158 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.leadsradar-agent-update.json outside project
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.leadsradar-agent-key-doubao-work.json
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandleadsradar-agent.mjs:4009 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = setTimeout(() => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedleadsradar-agent.mjs:3890 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…u63A2\u6817 MCP \u8BBE\u7F6E\u56FA\u5B9A ${pref === "edge" ? "Edge" : "Chrome"} \u4E3A\u9ED8\u8BA4\u6D4F\u89C8\u5668\u2014\u2014\u8FD0\u884C ${cmd2} \u6253\u5F00\u5B83\uFF0C\u63D2\u4EF6\u7EA6 5 \u79D2\u81EA\u52A8\u91CD\u…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandleadsradar-agent.mjs:4553 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = setTimeout(() => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35,211 tok
5 files · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.