lanhu-design@1.5.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "蓝湖设计稿读取、规格提取与切图下载 CLI(支持私有部署,可自定义 host)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 1.5.1
vet-skills diff lanhu-design 1.5.1 1.5.2This version reaches for something 1.5.1 did not: 1 new host (lanhuapp.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- lanhuapp.com
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
throw new LanhuError("LANHU_INVALID_ARGUMENT", "Cookie \u4E0D\u5F97\u5305\u542B\u6362\u884C\u7B26\u3002");Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.…efault = { name: "@imaegoo/lanhu-design", version: "1.5.2", description: "\u84DD\u6E56\u8BBE\u8BA1\u7A3F\u8BFB\u53D6\u3001\u89C4\u683C\u63D0\u53D6\u4E0E\u5207\u56FE\u4E0B\u8F7D CLI\uFF08\u652F\u6301\u79C1\u6709\u90E8\u7F72\uFF0C\u53EF\u81E…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.throw new LanhuError("LANHU_INVALID_ARGUMENT", "Cookie \u683C\u5F0F\u65E0\u6548\uFF0C\u5E94\u4E3A name=value; name2=value2\u3002");Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.import { chmod as chmod2, mkdir as mkdir2, readFile as readFile2, rename as rename2, rm, writeFile as writeFile2 } from "fs/promises";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.throw new LanhuError("LANHU_INVALID_ARGUMENT", "\u84DD\u6E56 host \u4E0D\u80FD\u5305\u542B\u8D26\u53F7\u5BC6\u7801\u3002");Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.node scripts/download_slices.mjs slices.json --output ./src/assets/images/slices/home --scale 2xFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.