lambdadb-mcp@0.6.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "MCP server for LambdaDB data plane" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
LAMBDADB_PROJECT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LAMBDADB_API_URL, LAMBDADB_BASE_URL, LAMBDADB_DEBUG, LAMBDADB_MCP_ENABLE_WRITE_TOOLS, LAMBDADB_MCP_INSTANCE, LAMBDADB_MCP_STATE_DIR, LAMBDADB_PROJECT_NAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso lambdadb.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names lambdadb.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LAMBDADB_PROJECT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.5.0
vet-skills diff lambdadb-mcp 0.5.0 0.6.0This version reaches for something 0.5.0 did not: 3 new tools (lambdadb_get_alias, lambdadb_get_branch, lambdadb_get_tag) · 4 rewritten tool descriptors (lambdadb_get_collection, lambdadb_list_aliases, lambdadb_list_branches, lambdadb_list_tags). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New tools
- lambdadb_get_alias, lambdadb_get_branch, lambdadb_get_tag
- Rewritten tool descriptors
- lambdadb_get_collection, lambdadb_list_aliases, lambdadb_list_branches, lambdadb_list_tags
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 3,493 lines in 21 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.