labby@2.7.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Rust MCP gateway with Code Mode, authentication, setup, logs, CLI, HTTP API, and operator web UI." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 21 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.No other findings across 2,532 lines in 9 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @dinglebear/labby@2.7.0 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dinglebear: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.