Skills/npm/krusch-grounded-harness

krusch-grounded-harness@0.2.1

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Turn-0 workspace grounding, spin-loop blocker, and defect-only stop gate for AI coding agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher krusch · publishing for 62 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OLLAMA_HOST, OLLAMA_MODEL, OLLAMA_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GEMINI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y krusch-grounded-harness

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 39 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
19sprocessdependency install exit 0
39sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · Options: -j, --json -h, --help -v, --version
39sprocessscript backend runs setup only
39sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:60 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth-drift-guard.js:168 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/\b(?:dict\s*\(\s*os\.environ\s*\)|os\.environ\.copy\s*\(\s*\)|JSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*process\.env\b)/;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/grounding-compiler.js:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn name === '.env' || name.startsWith('.env.') || name === '.DS_Store' || SQLITE_SIDECAR_RE.test(name);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'cat .env' }, alwaysForbidden: true }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:60 · Destructive file system command detected{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `config.json` & `.env.example` — Default port (`3782`), service name, `DB_PATH`, `DATA_DIR`, and `LOG_DIR`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,399 tok
2 files · 24 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for krusch-grounded-harness@0.2.1 as of 44 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim krusch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kruschPropose a patch to the maintainer