Skills/npm/kb-agentic-skill

kb-agentic-skill@1.39.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Knowledge-Base & Document-First protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex with risk triage, Vision governance, signal distillation and optional devPNT integration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher antoneeo · publishing for 215 daysInstalls 4,814Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.37.0

vet-skills diff kb-agentic-skill 1.37.0 1.39.0

This version reaches for something 1.37.0 did not: 1 new install script (node scripts/postinstall.js). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New install scripts
node scripts/postinstall.js

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 2 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sfilesystemread ~/.agentic-sdlc/orient-hook-wired · ~/.agentic-sdlc/remind-hook-wired outside project
0.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.9sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.9sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/git
1.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/git
1.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/git
1.1sprocessexec /pnpm/git
1.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/git
1.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/git
1.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/git
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
1.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.2sprocessexited 2: sdlc_check.py: error: the following arguments are required: cmd
1.2sprocess8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
1.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/knowledge.py:3300 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# router: a router throw must not kill this line. It measures NOTESFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/docs_site.py:62 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentINVISIBLE = re.compile("[­​-‏⁠-⁤]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:8 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentgenerated by scripts/whats_new.js from distributions/kb-agentic-skill/CHANGELOG.md: edit the CHANGELOG, then run node scripts/whats_new.js --writeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py:653 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py:683 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "diff", "--name-only", ref, "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py:673 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain", "--", rel],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py:662 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentskills/kb-agentic-skill/templates.md:163 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent[gate] The promises that outrank everything: what the user is guaranteed, what the architecture must always be true of. State each as ONE decision question withFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentskills/kb-agentic-skill/templates.md:143 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentInterview question 1: ONE concrete case that today does not get the expected result, with its example — never a missing feature. Cite the answer (REQUEST_[topicFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/sdlc_core.py:688 · Python subprocess execution detectedr2 = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "--others", "--exclude-standard", "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/postinstall.js:85 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log('👉 npx kb-agentic-init');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/scripts/docs_site.py:1369 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "check-ignore", "-q", str(out)], cwd=str(project),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedskills/kb-agentic-skill/docs_site/app.js:59 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contents = s.replace(/[­​-‏⁠-⁤]/g, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈11,050 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @antoneeo/kb-agentic-skill@1.39.0 as of 6 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim antoneeo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim antoneeoPropose a patch to the maintainer