Skills/npm/intent-engineering-mcp

intent-engineering-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Audit, scaffold, and triage agent intent specs against a 9-section template." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher swins · publishing for 186 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3 h ago
$claude mcp add intent-engineering-mcp -- npx -y @swins/intent-engineering-mcp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Reasonable to connect. No credential asked for, no third-party host named, Server started and answered tools/list.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.5sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimed3 tools: audit_intent_spec, generate_intent_spec_scaffold, assess_retrofit_level
26stoolsbaf707edd4a0edcf
26stools9cf23f10bfe0c8ce
26stoolsf426830e778965ed
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod 755 build/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/intent/safe-fs.js:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* read of `/etc/shadow`. `fs.stat` follows symlinks; we resolve themFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/intent/safe-fs.js:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `audit_intent_spec({ file_path: "/etc/passwd" })` and the contents would beFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈106 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈782 tok
3 tools · 261 per tool
Handshake
433 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 299

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @swins/intent-engineering-mcp@0.2.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.