Skills/npm/inspector

inspector@20.3.30

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP Inspector - A tool for inspecting and debugging MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mcp-use · publishing for 508 daysInstalls 175KLast detonated 48 min ago
$claude mcp add inspector -- npx -y @mcp-use/inspector
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso gstatic.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @mcp-use/inspector

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 20.3.29

vet-skills diff inspector 20.3.29 20.3.30

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 20.3.29 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · at async onImport.tracePromise.__proto__ (node:internal/modules/esm/loader:681:26) at async asyncRunEntryPointWithESMLoader (node:internal/modules/run_main:117:5) Node.js v22.23.5 [OAuth BFF] Mounted at /inspector/api/oauth/metadata and /inspector/api/oauth/proxy
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/server/index.js:371 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…=="<--"?`${e} ${r} ${n}`:`${e} ${r} ${n} ${await Vr(o)} ${s}`)}var Se=(t=console.log)=>async function(r,n){let{method:o,url:s}=r.req,a=s.slice(s.indexOf("/",8));await kt(t,"<--",o,a);let i=Date.now();await n(),await kt(t,"-->",o,a,r.res.st…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/server/index.js:371 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…lThis;return!(typeof e?.noColor=="boolean"?e.noColor:t!==void 0&&"NO_COLOR"in t?.env)}async function Mt(){let{navigator:t}=globalThis,e="cloudflare:workers";return!…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli.js:394 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @mcp-use/inspector --url http://localhost:3000/mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli.js:396 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @mcp-use/inspectorFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/server/index.js:288 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Ubuntu:wght@400;500;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" />Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:378 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…=="<--"?`${t} ${r} ${n}`:`${t} ${r} ${n} ${await fi(o)} ${s}`)}var Dt=(e=console.log)=>async function(r,n){let{method:o,url:s}=r.req,i=s.slice(s.indexOf("/",8));await Ln(e,"<--",o,i);let a=Date.now();await n(),await Ln(e,"-->",o,i,r.res.st…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/cli.js:295 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Ubuntu:wght@400;500;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" />Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:378 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…lThis;return!(typeof t?.noColor=="boolean"?t.noColor:e!==void 0&&"NO_COLOR"in e?.env)}async function Tn(){let{navigator:e}=globalThis,t="cloudflare:workers";return!…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli.js:384 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @mcp-use/inspector [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli.js:395 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @mcp-use/inspector --url http://localhost:3000/mcp --port 9000Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.