husmo@0.1.4
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Install the husmo skill and MCP registration into OpenCode, and the husmo binary if it is missing" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
detail(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return [`curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return [`curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.detail(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @frantufro/husmo install [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return [`curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.detail(` curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO}/main/install.sh | sh`)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @frantufro/husmo@0.1.4 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim frantufro: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.