hevy-mcp@6.2.4
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementation that interfaces with the Hevy fitness tracking app and its API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEY_VALIDATION_WARNINGHEVY_API_KEYHTTP_BEARER_TOKENOTEL_COLLECTOR_TOKENSENTRY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: HEVY_MCP_API_TIMEOUT, HEVY_MCP_DEBUG, HEVY_MCP_TELEMETRY, HEVY_MCP_TELEMETRY_DIAGNOSTICS, SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT, SENTRY_RELEASE- Where it talks to
- hevyapp.com, hevy.com, hevy-mcp.dev (its own)Also tsdown.dev, kubb.dev, chrisdoc.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tsdown.dev, kubb.dev, chrisdoc.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY_VALIDATION_WARNING, HEVY_API_KEY, HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN, OTEL_COLLECTOR_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN only into requests to hevyapp.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
" HEVY_API_KEY=your-key npx hevy-mcp",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const UTF8_BOM = "";Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.import { i as createHevyMcpServer, n as assertApiKey, p as createHevyClient } from "./config-Do4q1GLn.mjs";Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.…t, g as metricEndpointIdentity, h as diagnosticEndpointIdentity, i as createHevyMcpServer, l as sanitizeDiagnosticText$1, m as SAFE_OBSERVATION_CODES, n as assertApiKey, o as USER_HASH_CONTEXT, p as createHevyClient, r as parseConfig, s as…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them." HEVY_API_KEY=your-key npx hevy-mcp --transport http --port 3000"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…t as f, metricEndpointIdentity as g, diagnosticEndpointIdentity as h, createHevyMcpServer as i, sanitizeDiagnosticText as l, SAFE_OBSERVATION_CODES as m, assertApiKey as n, USER_HASH_CONTEXT as o, createHevyClient as p, parseConfig as r, c…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for hevy-mcp@6.2.4 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.