Skills/npm/hetzner-mcp-server

hetzner-mcp-server@4.0.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Hetzner Cloud API — manage servers, networks, volumes, and more" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher lazyants · publishing for 247 daysInstalls 1,810Last detonated 7d ago
$claude mcp add hetzner-mcp-server -- npx -y @lazyants/hetzner-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try hetzner-mcp-server` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.8sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.9sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/services/hetzner.js:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// `${VAR}` placeholder in a compose/.env file) still falls back to the Cloud token.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/resources/hetzner-reference.js:8 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// This compiles into dist/ so npm/npx consumers can read it without aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈62 tok
1 file · 76 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @lazyants/hetzner-mcp-server@4.0.3 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.