Skills/npm/harness-cli

harness-cli@1.32.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "CLI and MCP server for Harness, allocator.one's issue tracker" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher allocator-one · publishing for 97 daysInstalls 7,187Last detonated 16 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HARNESS_API_TOKEN or --budget-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: HARNESS_API_URL, HARNESS_CODE_STATE_DIR, MAX_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_BYTES, PLANS_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso infra.one — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names infra.one as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HARNESS_API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @allocator-one/harness-cli

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
12sprocessdependency install exit 0
32sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · login [options] sign in via the browser (infra.one session) logout [options] revoke and forget the stored login whoami [options] show the resolved host and credential source help [command] display help for command
32sprocessscript backend runs setup only
32sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-FQCEASYM.js:321 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn "npx runs a throwaway copy";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/infraone.js:335 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering…r and store the credential").option("--no-browser", "print the sign-in link and paste the token instead").option("--json", "print the result as JSON").helpGroup(general).actio…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:2942 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesopts.json === true ? json(output.json) : output.humanFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/chunk-CH3WOVOV.js:2219 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering`Open ${baseUrl}/cli/login in a browser, authorize, and paste the token below (an outside expert pastes the pxc_ credential minted in their expert view instead).`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsspec/code-policy/policy_floor.json:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-FQCEASYM.js:310 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ ...env, [REEXEC_SENTINEL]: "1" },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/chunk-RZL23EQ6.js:228 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringreturn { ok: false, message: "--no-browser needs a terminal to paste the token into; for scripts, set INFRAONE_TOKEN" };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-CH3WOVOV.js:150 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn this.json(await this.raw("POST", path2, { form, timeoutMs: uploadTimeoutMs(bodyBytes) }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:3204 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait withConfig(opts.json === true, true, (ctx) => planOutput(ctx, id, step, input));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsspec/code-policy/policy_floor.json:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:2806 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprocess.stdout.write(jsonFlag ? json(output.json) : output.human);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsspec/code-policy/policy_floor.json:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/chunk-RZL23EQ6.js:230 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringnotify(`Open ${loginPageUrl(config)} in a browser, authorize, and paste the token below.`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:1279 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:1294 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:1280 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-CH3WOVOV.js:138 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn this.json(await this.raw("PUT", path2, { json: this.withActor(body) }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagREADME.md:1134 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file- `harness steer <job-id> <instruction>` posts the instruction in the job'sFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Slack webhook URLspec/code-policy/policy_vectors.json:320 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slack"text": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,608 tok
2 files · 72 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @allocator-one/harness-cli@1.32.0 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim allocator-one: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Slack webhook URL≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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