hardcharger-mcp@2.5.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server and Claude Desktop extension for Hardcharger™, GizmoData™'s DuckDB 2.0 server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
HARDCHARGER_MCP_BEARER_TOKENHARDCHARGER_MCP_BROKER_TOKENHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOW_INSECUREHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCEHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZED_EMAILSHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUERHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URIHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_SCOPESHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_PROXYHARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_USER_CLAIMor--oauth-client-idConfiguration, not credentials: FACADE_PATH, HARDCHARGER_ALLOW_WRITES, HARDCHARGER_BROWSER, HARDCHARGER_CONNECTION_NAME, HARDCHARGER_CONNECTIONS, HARDCHARGER_ENABLE_SSO, HARDCHARGER_MAX_CELL_CHARS, HARDCHARGER_MAX_ROWS, HARDCHARGER_MCP_BROKER_ALLOW_INSECURE, HARDCHARGER_MCP_BROKER_CACHE_SECONDS, HARDCHARGER_MCP_BROKER_URL, HARDCHARGER_MCP_MAX_SESSIONS, HARDCHARGER_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, HARDCHARGER_MCP_SESSION_IDLE_SECONDS, HARDCHARGER_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, HARDCHARGER_READ_ONLY, HARDCHARGER_RESUME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for HARDCHARGER_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN, HARDCHARGER_MCP_BROKER_TOKEN, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOW_INSECURE, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_AUTHORIZED_EMAILS, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URI, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_PROXY, HARDCHARGER_MCP_OAUTH_USER_CLAIM and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 6,595 lines in 33 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.