Skills/npm/guanskill

guanskill@0.1.56

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Guandata BI Skills 聚合安装包 - 一次性安装和更新 guancli、guands、guanetl、guanwf、guanvis、guanmetric" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher guandata · publishing for 225 daysInstalls 2,521Last detonated 46 min ago
$claude mcp add guanskill -- npx -y @guandata/guanskill
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.55

vet-skills diff guanskill 0.1.55 0.1.56

This version reaches for something 0.1.55 did not: 1 new install script (node bin/postinstall.js). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New install scripts
node bin/postinstall.js

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guancli. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guands. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guanetl. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guanmetric. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guanvis. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Cannot find @guandata/guanwf. Reinstall with: npm install -g @guandata/guanskill
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocess8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:52 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: AI suite skill updated successfully.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/install-env.js:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst childEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:38 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: refreshing suite AI skill (${CLI_NAME} install-suite-skill)...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/run.js:203 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// --yes: postinstall 等非交互环境下 npx 需要免确认下载 skills CLIFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:33 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: skipping automatic install-skill (${reason}).`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈685 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @guandata/guanskill@0.1.56 as of 11 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.