Skills/npm/guancli

guancli@1.0.73

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "观远 BI 命令行工具 - 通过 API 操作 ETL、数据集、页面、表单等资源,并提供 ChatBI 问数/洞察能力" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher guandata · publishing for 225 daysInstalls 4,464Last detonated 10 min ago
$claude mcp add guancli -- npx -y @guandata/guancli
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.72

vet-skills diff guancli 1.0.72 1.0.73

This version reaches for something 1.0.72 did not: 1 new install script (node bin/postinstall.js). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New install scripts
node bin/postinstall.js

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: If you used --omit=optional or optional=false, remove that setting first.
0.4sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:50 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: AI skill updated successfully.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/guancli/SKILL.md:247 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- 该命令会下载 SuperApp 模板并创建项目目录,随后尝试复制 `.env.template`、更新 `package.json` 名称、初始化 git,并根据模板情况执行 `setup.sh` 或 `npm install` + 启动本地 dev server。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:36 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: refreshing AI skill (${CLI_NAME} install-skill)...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/install-env.js:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst childEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/postinstall.js:33 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[${CLI_NAME}] postinstall: skipping automatic install-skill (${reason}).`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/run.js:177 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// --yes: postinstall 等非交互环境下 npx 需要免确认下载 skills CLIFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/guancli/SKILL.md:336 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| 仅改提示词或本次筛选条件(仪表板须已开启洞察) | `config preview --config-file insight.json --output preview-result.json`,检查结果后按用户目标决定是否保存;预览不写配置 |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/guancli/SKILL.md:328 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| 按已保存配置生成报告 | `insight page <page_id> --output result.json`;卡片用 `insight card <cd_id> --page-id <page_id> --output result.json`。使用 BI 已保存配置,不读取本地配置文件;`--selector` 仅影响本次筛选条件。等待同一次执行结束并检查结果 |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandbin/run.js:218 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// chmod may fail in read-only environmentsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/guancli/SKILL.md:330 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| 预览本地配置中的提示词 | `insight config preview --config-file insight.json --output preview-result.json`,同时支持 PAGE 和 CARD;使用文件中的提示词及本次筛选条件,不保存配置 |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,102 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.