Skills/npm/granttap-mcp

granttap-mcp@0.8.198

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Approve, answer and steer Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Grok Build from iPhone, iPad and Apple Watch: the local runtime, CLI and MCP server for GrantTap, a free App Store download." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher sergii-ziborov · publishing for 119 daysInstalls 22,592Last detonated 14 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
granttap.com (its own)Also chatgpt.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable and talks to granttap.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y granttap-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.8.195

vet-skills diff granttap-mcp 0.8.195 0.8.198

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.195 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
10sprocessdependency install exit 0
30sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-U0kmSd/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/granttap-mcp/apps/bridge/src/runtime-updates/selection.mjs' } Node.js v22.23.5
30sprocessscript backend runs setup only
30sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationbin/granttap-mcp.mjs:22 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime&& process.env.GRANTTAP_DISABLE_AUTO_UPDATE !== "1" && !process.env.NODE_TEST_CONTEXT;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/bridge/src/tools/updater.ts:264 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst updaterEnv = { ...env, PATH: [nodeDirectory, env.PATH ?? ''].join(delimiter) };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)apps/mcp/src/bin/serve.ts:1 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkimport { startHttpMcpServer } from "../http/http-server";Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/bridge/src/tools/updater.ts:210 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescwd, env: { ...env, NO_COLOR: "1", CI: "1" }, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecursor-plugin/mcp.json:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…p\")));\n if (installed) return { command: installed, args: [] };\n const npx = first(roots.map((root) => join(root, \"npx\"))) || \"npx\";\n return { comma…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecursor-plugin/stdio-bootstrap.cjs:31 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst npx = first(roots.map((root) =>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellapps/bridge/src/tools/updater.ts:192 · Remote installer piped to shell+ "In a trusted terminal: curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh";Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternapps/bridge/src/tools/updater.ts:192 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code+ "In a trusted terminal: curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh";Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecursor-plugin/stdio-bootstrap.cjs:25 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst npx = first(roots.map((root) => join(root, "npx"))) || "npx";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈82 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sergii-ziborov: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sergii-ziborovPropose a patch to the maintainer