Skills/npm/gitlab-mcp

gitlab-mcp@13.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Advanced GitLab MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher structured-world · publishing for 424 daysInstalls 17,924Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try gitlab-mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: README links to an external installer; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.9sprocessdependency install exit 1
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
1.0sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
1.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
README links to an external installerREADME.md → https://github.com/structured-world/gitlab-mcp/releases/latest/download/gitlab-mcp-codex.ziphttps://github.com/structured-world/gitlab-mcp/releases/latest/download/gitlab-mcp-codex.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:599 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev:sse": "node --env-file=.env.test -r source-map-support/register -r ts-node/register --experimental-specifier-resolution=node --experimental-print-required-tla --watch src/main.ts sse",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:600 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev": "node --env-file=.env.test -r source-map-support/register -r ts-node/register --experimental-specifier-resolution=node --experimental-print-required-tla --watch src/main.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:615 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:help": "printf '# Test Scripts\\n yarn test - Unit tests only (fast, safe default)\\n yarn test <pattern> - Unit tests matching pattern\\n yarn test:cov - Unit test cFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/cli/list-tools.js:860 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:598 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev:stdio": "node --env-file=.env.test -r source-map-support/register -r ts-node/register --experimental-specifier-resolution=node --experimental-print-required-tla --watch src/main.ts stdio",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/src/oauth/config.js:107 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code│ npx @structured-world/gitlab-mcp setup │Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/cli/list-tools.js:916 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/src/handlers.js:696 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"Run 'npx @structured-world/gitlab-mcp setup' for interactive configuration, " +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/cli/list-tools.js:715 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:625 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"list-tools:dev": "node --env-file=.env.test -r source-map-support/register -r ts-node/register --experimental-specifier-resolution=node src/cli/list-tools.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/cli/list-tools.js:829 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/cli/list-tools.js:1026 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈46 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @structured-world/gitlab-mcp@13.2.1 as of 8d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim structured-world: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim structured-worldPropose a patch to the maintainer