gitlab-mcp@1.7.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A MCP server for GitLab" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GITLAB_AUTH_COOKIE_PATHGITLAB_DOWNLOAD_TOKEN_SECRETGITLAB_DOWNLOAD_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSGITLAB_JOB_TOKENGITLAB_MCP_OAUTHGITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDGITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKENGITLAB_TOKEN_FILEGITLAB_TOKEN_SCRIPTGITLAB_USE_OAUTHNODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDREMOTE_AUTHORIZATIONConfiguration, not credentials: ENABLE_DYNAMIC_API_URL, GITLAB_ALLOW_CI_VARIABLE_VALUES, GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS, GITLAB_ALLOWED_TOOLS, GITLAB_API_URL, GITLAB_API_URLS, GITLAB_CA_CERT_PATH, GITLAB_DENIED_TOOLS_REGEX, GITLAB_DISABLED_CAPABILITIES, GITLAB_ENABLE_CI_VARIABLE_TOOLS, GITLAB_ENABLE_COMPATIBILITY_ALIASES, GITLAB_ENABLE_DEPENDENCY_PROXY_TOOLS, GITLAB_ENABLE_JMESPATH, GITLAB_ENABLE_ORBIT_TOOLS, GITLAB_ENABLE_RAW_API, GITLAB_ERROR_DETAIL_MODE, GITLAB_HTTP_MAX_RETRIES, GITLAB_HTTP_RETRY_BASE_MS, GITLAB_HTTP_RETRY_MAX_DELAY_MS, GITLAB_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS, GITLAB_LOCAL_FILE_ROOTS, GITLAB_MAX_LOCAL_FILE_BYTES, GITLAB_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, GITLAB_PERMISSION_MODE, GITLAB_RESPONSE_MASKING_FILE, GITLAB_RESPONSE_MODE, GITLAB_TOOLSETS, HTTP_HOST- Where it talks to
- gitlab.invalid (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GITLAB_AUTH_COOKIE_PATH, GITLAB_DOWNLOAD_TOKEN_SECRET, GITLAB_DOWNLOAD_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, GITLAB_JOB_TOKEN, GITLAB_MCP_OAUTH, GITLAB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN, GITLAB_TOKEN_FILE, GITLAB_TOKEN_SCRIPT, GITLAB_USE_OAUTH, NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED, REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION and talks to gitlab.invalid. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.6.1
vet-skills diff gitlab-mcp 1.6.1 1.7.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.6.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.6.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 21 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const baseUrl = new URL(context.env.MCP_SERVER_URL ?? `http://${context.env.HTTP_HOST}:${String(context.env.HTTP_PORT)}`);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.remoteCredentials: Boolean(context?.env.REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION || context?.env.GITLAB_MCP_OAUTH)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const detailMode = context?.env.GITLAB_ERROR_DETAIL_MODE ?? "full";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.? new URL(appEnv.MCP_SERVER_URL ?? `http://${appEnv.HTTP_HOST}:${String(appEnv.HTTP_PORT)}`)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.* embed credentials (https://user:token@host), and startup errors end up inFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.