gitlab-mcp-server@0.9.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "GitLab MCP Server - A Model Context Protocol server for GitLab integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher yoda.digital · joined 0 days agoInstalls 3,970Last detonated 2 h ago
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
1.0sprocessdependency install exit 1
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
1.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.4
1.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 1)
1.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/gitlab-api.test.js:273 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/schemas.ts:6 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:28 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/schemas.js:2 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/gitlab-api.test.js:140 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/schemas.ts:3 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commande2e/Dockerfile:78 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)e2e/Dockerfile:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).github/workflows/e2e.yml:83 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/gitlab-api.test.js:223 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressDockerfile:45 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File permission modification commande2e/Dockerfile:75 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/schemas.js:5 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressDockerfile:45 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)e2e/Dockerfile:32 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/e2e.yml:172 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/e2e.yml:203 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/gitlab-api.test.js:290 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)e2e/src/setup/global-setup.ts:15 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/gitlab-api.test.ts:356 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)e2e/docker-compose.yml:66 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/gitlab-api.test.ts:335 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/gitlab-api.test.ts:272 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/gitlab-api.test.ts:169 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yoda.digital: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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