Skills/npm/ghcard

ghcard@0.2.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Create GitHub profile and repository cards for READMEs, link previews and social posts." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher ghcardhq · publishing for 14 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add ghcard -- npx -y @ghcardhq/ghcard
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Needs
GHCARD_API_KEY, --api-key — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GHCARD_API_KEY or --with-token
Where it talks to
githubcard.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GHCARD_API_KEY and talks to githubcard.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets GHCARD_API_KEY=githubcard.com -- npx -y @ghcardhq/ghcard

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for GHCARD_API_KEY); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 50 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
10sprocessdependency install exit 0
30sprocessrelaunched with a decoy GHCARD_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
50sclaimedstartup only: exited before answering, asking for GHCARD_API_KEY, --api-key (a decoy value was refused)
50sprocessscript backend runs setup only
50sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/cli.js:511 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringif (options.prompt) app.options.stderr.write("Paste your API key (from https://githubcard.com/dashboard): ");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

No other findings across 1,921 lines in 5 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @ghcardhq/ghcard@0.2.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.