formlab-mcp@0.6.80
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Read-only Model Context Protocol server for FormLab. Lets Claude and other MCP clients read and analyze your FormLab data, from a local export file or your live cloud workspace." Observed in sandbox: sends data to ufizhypibwqqpavhxdwt.supabase.co.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- FORMLAB_MCP_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FORMLAB_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FL_RX_GROUP_KEYS, FORMLAB_EXPORT, FORMLAB_REFRESH_SECONDS, FORMLAB_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, FORMLAB_SUPABASE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso supabase.co, frankfurter.dev, er-api.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted ufizhypibwqqpavhxdwt.supabase.co (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted ufizhypibwqqpavhxdwt.supabase.co, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: sends data to ufizhypibwqqpavhxdwt.supabase.co.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 46 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
const cvs = amt => sgn(conv(amt)); // convert + signed formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Hot-reload: if the export file changes on disk while the serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for formlab-mcp@0.6.80 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juliu1980: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.