Skills/npm/fireflyiii-mcp

fireflyiii-mcp@1.0.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Firefly III personal finance manager" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher daften · publishing for 176 daysInstalls 3,912Last detonated 55 min ago
$claude mcp add fireflyiii-mcp -- npx -y @daften/fireflyiii-mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Needs
FIREFLY_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FIREFLY_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDFIREFLY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FIREFLY_DEBUG, FIREFLY_URL, MCP_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_PREFIXES, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_GROUPS, MCP_PRESET, MCP_READ_ONLY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.ai, claude.com, attacker.test — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, claude.com, attacker.test as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FIREFLY_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, FIREFLY_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @daften/fireflyiii-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.0.0

vet-skills diff fireflyiii-mcp 1.0.0 1.0.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for FIREFLY_TOKEN); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 54 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sprocessrelaunched with a decoy FIREFLY_TOKEN (tagged; nothing real)
54sclaimedstartup only: exited before answering, asking for FIREFLY_TOKEN (a decoy value was refused)
54sprocessscript backend runs setup only
54sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/http.d.ts:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* memory or, past V8's maximum string length, throw inside the stream listener and kill the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/http.d.ts:36 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ng, port: number): Promise<void>; export declare function startHttpServer(createMcpServer: () => McpServer, host: string, requestedPort: number, portWasExplicit: boolean, oauthClientId: string | undefined, fireflyUrl: string, tryListenFn?:…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/http.d.ts:33 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport declare function createMcpRequestHandler(createMcpServer: () => McpServer): (req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse) => Promise<void>;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/http.js:25 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* memory or, past V8's maximum string length, throw inside the stream listener and kill the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addressdist/http.js:103 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target// comparing). The one exception is the port-wildcard form 'http://192.168.1.10:' (aFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'See .env.example for configuration instructions.\n');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"test:integration": "dotenv -e .env.test -- vitest run src/tests/integration.test.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'See .env.example for configuration instructions.\n');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev": "dotenv -e .env -- tsx src/index.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 54 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.